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CHARLES W. HOWE*

Water Resources Planning in a
Federation of States: Equity versus

Efficiency
ABSTRACT
Equity and efficiency are inextricably tied together since the
prices used in efficiency analyses depend on the distribution of
wealth. Beyond that, many equity considerations have efficiency
implications when evaluated in the appropriate geographical and
temporal context. In some situations, there are genuine efficiencyequity tradeoffs, but in many situations building equity into policy
or project design also will enhance efficiency. Appropriategoverning
institutions that more closely correspond with the resourcesystems
being governed help assure appropriate consideration of both
efficiency and equity.

INTRODUCTION
In the post World War II period, students of economics were
taught that economic efficiency and equity were separable issues, that
economists should tend to the task of economic efficiency (making GDP
as large as possible) while society would attend to equity in the
distribution of GDP through other (generally unspecified) mechanisms
like safety net programs.' It was also stressed (quite correctly) that equity
issues were likely to be less contentious in a growing economy than in
a stagnant one.
The concept of economic efficiency is manifested operationally in
two forms: the concept of Pareto efficiency, and benefit-cost analysis3 .
A project or policy is said to be Pareto-efficient if it benefits some parties
without making anyone worse off. While invoking this concept as a
criterion for judging projects or policy changes avoids making

Professor of Economics and Director, Environment & Behavior Program, Institute
of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.
1. See generally RICHARD A. MUScRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIc FINANCE: A STUDY IN
PUBLIC ECONOMY (1959).
2. BRIAN R. BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WIH CALCULUS 93-95
(1988).
3. See generally ANANDARUP RAY, WORLD BANK, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: ISSUES AND
METHODOLOGIES (1984).
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interpersonal comparisons of well being, the concept is seldom applicable
to real world projects which typically benefit some but injure others.
Benefit-cost assessment of projects or policy changes adds benefits
and costs over individuals and over time to arrive at a monetized
measure of net gains-the "present value of net benefits" (PVNB)
attributable to the project. In typical applications,4 the same weight is
given to all benefits and costs independent of the recipient.5 The
benefit-cost test determines if PVNB is positive. A project accepted under
this criterion could very well leave some persons better off and others
worse off for it is based on the idea that gainers should be able to
compensate losers from the project-not that they would actually do so.
In many situations, adequate compensation is not paid (e.g. compensation
to land owners whose land is taken for public projects but who preferred
not to sell at market prices, or absence of compensation to taxpayers who
subsidize beneficiaries of water projects).
The Pareto and benefit-cost criteria cannot be separated from
basic equity considerations since both must be based on existing prices
that depend upon the existing distribution of income and wealth. Given
a different distribution of wealth, prices would be different and the
assessment of the project might be different. Scitovsky6 pointed out that,
if a project or policy change were major in nature, it might be possible for
a pre-project assessment to recommend the project, while an ex-post
assessment might recommend against it.7
Does this interdependence of efficiency and equity imply that
there must be a (negative) trade-off between the two? That is, must an
improvement in economic efficiency imply greater inequity or vice versa?
There are some situations where such a trade-off exists. Consider the
typical irrigation system that delivers water to lands along the canal. If
water is scarce, economic efficiency calls for applying more water per
hectare at the head of the canal (close to the source) than at the foot of
the canal. Typical patterns of land ownership (especially in Third World
countries) place wealthier persons at the head and poorer persons at the
foot of the canal. The most efficient allocation of water may well be
unfair!

4. See, e.g., W. LEE HANSEN & BURTON A. WEISBROD, BENEFITS, COSTS AND FINANCE OF
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION (1969).
5. See, e.g., LYN SQUIRE & HERMAN G. VAN DER TAK, WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF PROJECTS (1975).
6. Tibor Scitovsky, The State of Welfare Economics, 41 AM. ECON. REV. 302-15 (1951).

7. It is also true that market prices may not adequately reflect the benefits or costs
(willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept) imposed on individuals, e.g. the value of a piece
of property to a person who chooses not to sell at the market price.
8. Much has been written about the inequity and corruption of water distribution in
Third World countries, e.g., Robert Wade, The System of Administrative and PoliticalCorruption:
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In many situations, however, the best way of achieving efficiency
in the long run may be to build equity into the project, i.e. by enhancing
or protecting equity, we may generate greater efficiency gains. The
remaining sections of this paper elaborate this point.
SHORTCOMINGS OF APPLIED BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS THAT
CONFOUND EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
Policy analysis attempts to compare the state-of-the-world with
a particular policy or project in place and the state-of-the-world without
that policy or project. The analysis can be many-dimensional, or it can be
unidimensional in terms of money, as in benefit-cost analysis. A
mid-point between these is to use "multiple objective evaluation"
proposed by the Water Resources Council 9 in which monetizable benefits
and costs are incorporated in a PVNB analysis, accompanied by other
"accounts" which contain descriptive materials relating to environmental
and social changes caused by the policy change.
A "with-without" evaluation is extremely complex to carry out for
it requires the analysis of physical linkages (water diversions and return
flows), economic linkages (agricultural demand for inputs and the
processing of agricultural outputs) and cultural and social changes that
may not be monetizable. Questions of appropriate geographic and
temporal scope thus arise.
GeographicScope of the Analysis
While project analyses must be terminated somewhere, arbitrary
circles have often been drawn around the project site with impacts
outside the circle being ignored. Such omissions may be imposed by (1)
modeling and computational limitations, (2) an intent to ignore certain
effects, (3) a lack of knowledge of the linkages to areas farther from the
project site, and (4) the existence of jurisdictional boundaries (state or
national) that fail to correspond with natural or economic systems
boundaries.
Canal Irrigation in South India, 18 J. DEVEL STUD. 287-328 (1982); ROBERT CHAMBERS,
MANAGING CANAL IRRIGATION: PRACTICAL ANALYSIS FROM SOUTH ASIA (1988); YAYASAN
AGRO EKONOMIKA, GROWTH AND EQUITY IN INDONESIAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
(Mubyarto ed., 1982). The PASTEN system used in Indonesia is driven by equity to deliver
equal amounts of water throughout the system. See Charles Howe, Equity versus Efficiency
in Indonesion Irrigation: An Economic Evaluation of the PASTEN Method, in SOCIAL ECONOMIC
AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THIRD WORLD IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT (R.K. Sampath &
Robert A. Youngs eds., 1990).
9. United States Water Resources Council, Proprosed Principle and Standards for
Planning Water and Related Land Resources, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,114-24,194 (1971).
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Modeling and computational limitations have provided the
excuse in many economic analyses for excluding all "secondary" or
"indirect" effects from the analysis. Some secondary impacts contain real
economic benefits or costs, such as when a water transfer from
agriculture causes the failure of agriculturally linked businesses, leaving
labor and other semi-mobile resources unemployed for some period of
time. Other impacts take the form of price changes concurrent with the
reallocation of resources (so-called "pecuniary" impacts) and do not
represent real benefits or costs (although they remain relevant for the
analysis of equity impacts: who gains or loses). Real benefits or costs at
the secondary level are frequently omitted.
The geographical circle may be tightly drawn around the project
site with the intent of diverting public attention from further downstream
effects. Ignoring the salinity impacts on Mexico of the Welton-Mohawk
Project would be a case in point, as would the continued expansion of
irrigated agriculture in the San Joaquin Valley of California while
ignoring the drainage impacts on other farmland and on wildlife areas.
Lack of knowledge of linkages to other systems undoubtedly has
been the cause of many simplistic project analyses undertaken by foreign
consultants in the Third World. World Bank and USAID water projects
have, until the last decade, been designed and evaluated by engineers.
While well-equipped to deal with structures and hydrology, the designers
frequently were unaware of the complexities of the traditional
agricultural, livestock and fisheries systems they were amending (or
destroying). Driver and Marchand"0 identify the many values generated
by African flood plains: riverine fisheries that depend on the seasonal
floods; recession agriculture similarly dependent on flooding; and wildlife
on which local people depend. Much less obvious are the seasonal cattle
migrations that come to the flood plain from great distances during the
'dry season to graze on local grasses and crop aftermath. Designers of
many African reservoir projects certainly did not understand these
systems and failed to count their demise as costs of "modern"
development. Marchand has recomputed PVNB for several major African
irrigation projects," allowing for the values of the traditional production
systems displaced or disrupted. In all cases, the net benefits from the
traditional systems exceeded those from the reservoir projects.
The existence of jurisdictional boundaries that do not correspond
to the river or other natural systems is one of the greatest causes of

10. C.A. DRIVER AND MARCEL MARCHAND, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
TAMING THE FLOODS: ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF FLOODPLAIN DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

(1985). A summary also is found in 22 NATURE AND RESOURCES 13-22 (1986).
11. Marcel Marchand, The Productivity of African Floodplains, 29 INT'L J. ENVTL. STUD.

201-11 (1987).
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inefficiency in the design and operation of water systems. "Downstream"
comes to mean 'beyond the state line," with downstream impacts being
ignored. These problems adhere to natural resources other than water,
too, as the recent killing of Kenya elephants in Tanzania has emphasized.
The lack of correspondence of jurisdictional and system boundaries
guarantees that one jurisdiction will impose "negative externalities" on
other jurisdictions.
Howe and Ahrens 2 have calculated partial system-wide
opportunity costs of water consumption used in the several sub-basins of
the Upper Colorado River Basin. These are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Instream values per acre-foot of reduced consumptive use in the Upper
Colorado River Basin
Subbasin

1
2,3,6-8
4
5

Water
opportunity cost
in Lower Basin
$30
30
30
30

Salinity
damages
averted
$238
38
38
280

Power value
at 44 mills
$46
31
72
31

TOTAL
$114
99
140
341

Subbasin identification: I = Green River to Flaming Gorge;
2 = Yampa and White Basins; 3 = Green River to the Colorado River; 4 Gunnison; 5 =
Colorado Upper Main Stem; 6 = Delores;
7 = San Juan; 8 = Colorado above Lee's Ferry

Very few uses in the Upper Basin generate net incomes as high
as these (partial) opportunity costs, let alone high enough to cover project
construction and operation costs. Under the Colorado River Compact, the
Upper Basin is under no obligation to take account of Lower Basin values
of water once the required 7.5 million acre-feet per year have been
delivered. Even within the State of Colorado, appropriators of water are
not required to recognize costs imposed on other state or federal entities
by their consumptive uses, e.g. out-of-basin transfers from the Gunnison
Basin to Arapaho County that reduce recreational opportunities,
hydro-electric power generation, and salinity levels in downstream
reaches within Colorado.
This raises the very important general issue of the appropriate
level of decentralization of jurisdiction over natural resource systems,
especially water. Current political trends in the United States favor more

12. Charles W. Howe & W. Ashley Ahrens, Water Resources of the Upper ColoradoRiver
Basin: Problemsand Policy Alternatives, in WATER AND ARID LANDS OF THE WESTERN UNITED
STATES (Mohamed EI-Ashry & Diana C. Gibbons eds., 1988).
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decentralized resource management. Environmental policy in the
European Union 3 strongly emphasizes "subsidiarity," i.e. placing
responsibility for policy and enforcement at the lowest possible level
consistent with avoidance of serious externalities. While lowering the
level of jurisdiction helps in incorporating local physical conditions and
values in decisions, it also increases the likelihood of significant
externalities. The tension between "subsidiarity" and externalities is one
of the largest remaining problems of policy design.
Temporal Scope of the Analysis
As noted above, project analysis is typically based on a
"with-without" analysis. Benefit-cost analysis usually compares the
forecasted new equilibrium of the system with the project in place and the
forecasted new equilibrium without the project. Such comparisons involve
great uncertainty about when these equilibria will be reached, and they
usually ignore the paths by which the system approaches the new
equilibria. The equity and efficiency impacts during the transitional
period can be important and long-lived.
The dynamics of physical system evolution are often poorly
understood. The extensive behavior of large reservoirs is a major case in
point." Lake Kariba in Zambia first filled with water hyacinths to an
extent that greatly reduced active storage and interfered with electric
power generation. After the nutrient and water levels settled down over
a 15-year period, the water plants nearly disappeared, and highly
nutritional shoreline grasses emerged. Lake Volta in Ghana experienced
large fluctuations in fish populations as well as the spread of
schistosomiasis and onchocerciasis. Lake Nasser on the Nile had similar
impacts. These fluctuations had major impacts on human well-being.
The displacement of human populations by large reservoirs has
been given little or no weight in the evaluation of many projects. In the
project plan for the Kousou Dam on the Bandama River in Ivory Coast
(1960), one page was devoted to the appropriate cash payment to the
displaced population. Problems in resettling these people ultimately cost
the government as much as the dam itself. What many would have
identified as a matter of equity (resettlement) turned out to have
profound efficiency (cost) implications. The same was true at Lake Volta
and is currently proving to be true at the infamous Sardar Sarovar project

13. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MARKET, 1992: THE ENVIRONMENT DIMENSION (1990).
14. EDWARD GOLDSMITH & NICHOLAS HILDYARD, THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL

EFFECTS OF LARGE DAMS (1986).
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on the Narmada River in India.' 5
A study of the impacts of agricultural water sales from
Colorado's Arkansas River Valley to municipalities found very significant
long-term unemployment imposed on the area of origin, with impacts on
incomes in secondary activities and serious erosion of the county tax base
(Crowley County).16
In sum, the dynamic transitional impacts of projects are
frequently not understood and often ignored. Impacts that might be
identified as "equity" impacts at the time of project analysis frequently
turn out to have important efficiency effects. The potential for
compensating losing parties that underlies benefit-cost analysis is seldom
carried out, leaving a residuum of equity issues. The transitional
processes may be even more important than the new equilibria targeted
by our projects or policies.
CONCLUSION
Albert E. Utton, distinguished legal scholar and former Editor of

the Natural Resources Journal, discussed the pros and cons of two
contradictory legal philosophies incorporated in two decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1982: the doctrine of "equitable apportionment" of
interstate waters between states and the "commerce clause" doctrine that
declares water to be an article of commerce (marketable commodity) and
thereby subject to constitutional protections against interstate trade
restraints."' The former doctrine is concerned with equity between
states that share a water source, while the latter doctrine asserts that
market forces should be allowed to determine water allocation among
states, subject to some welfare and police powers qualifications. Utton
argues that there are issues beyond market efficiency that warrant the
acceptance of the equity doctrine-"to protect the balance within the
federal union of states and to ensure the stability necessary for state and
regional water planning." He concludes:
"However, if there is merit to the idea of the founding fathers
that it is desirable to maintain balance between member states,
if there is merit to the idea that diversity contributes to a

15. BRADFORD MORSE & THOMAS BERGER, RESOURCE FUTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
SARDAR SAROVAR: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW (1992).

16. Charles W. Howe et al., The Economic Impacts of Agriculture-to-Urban Water Transfers
on the Area of Orgin: A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado, 72 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 1200-1204 (1990). See also Kenneth Weber, Communities in Decline; Water Transfers and
Socioeconomic Analysis: A Methodological Note, 6 J. ARID LAND. STUD. 45-49 (1990).
17. Albert E. Utton, In Search ofan Integrated Principle for Interstate Water Law: Regulation
versus the Market Place, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 985 (1985).
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strong economy, and if there is value in the suggestion that
viable constituent parts contribute to a stronger federation,
then perhaps it is appropriate to design a doctrine of interstate
water allocation which, while limiting the territorial
sovereignty of individual states, recognizes the territorial
integrity of member states and equitably balances their
competing needs... ,18
Utton is arguing for equity as an important criterion for public policy,
but, beyond that, he seems to be stating that equity must be built into our
policies and projects. It will not just happen.
It was noted above that equity can have important efficiency
implications. Programs, policies and projects that impose inequity on
affected parties often generate social malaise that leads to high efficiency
costs. Many of these costs occur during the transition from today's
equilibrium to that intended by the project. Analysis of the transition is
typically slighted and often ignored in project and policy evaluations.
A major cause of both inefficiency and inequity is the lack of
correspondence between political boundaries and natural resource
systems--especially rivers. This guarantees that full system effects will
not be taken into account, i.e. that externalities (usually negative but
sometimes positive) will exist. In some instances, these
jurisdictional-physical system misfits have been created through attempts
to deal with equity issues. A prime example is the Colorado River
Compact of 1922 that, in the interests of interbasin equity, allows Upper
Basin water users to ignore their impacts on the Lower Basin.19
Even within individual states, the laws governing water
appropriation frequently allow appropriators to ignore negative
downstream effects on others--especially regarding non-market amenities
from streamflows.
Today's political environment seems to favor greater
decentralization of decision-making (Europe's principle of "subsidarity").
While this allows a greater reflection of local values, it also increases the
occurrence of undesirable externalities-the resolution of which will
require more extensive negotiation. Rethinking our institutions for the
governance of natural resource systems is part of the answer, e.g. river
basin commissions, regional airsheds, wildlife commissions and
ecosystem management agencies that span state boundaries and give
consideration to both equity and efficiency on a system-wide'basis.

18. Id. at 986, 989.
19. The Colorado River Compact was approved by the United States Congress in
section 13(a) of the Boulder Canyon Project Act. See 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1995).

